Cognitive Development

General Overview & Introduction to Cognitive Development

Theory Theory, Modularity Nativism, Dynamic Systems Theory -- Overview

Abstract :

This study investigated the role of language in the development of theory of mind. It was hypothesized that the acquisition of the syntactic and semantic properties of sentential complements would facilitate the development of a representational theory of mind. Sixty preschoolers who failed false belief and sentential complement pretests were randomly assigned to training on false belief, sentential complements, or relative clauses (as a control group). All the children were post-tested on a set of different theory of mind tasks, sentential complements and relative clauses. The main findings were that the group trained on sentential complements not only acquired the linguistic knowledge fostered by the training, but also significantly increased their scores on a range of theory of mind tasks. In contrast, false belief training only led to improved theory of mind scores but had no influence on language. The control group, trained on relative clauses, showed no improvement on theory of mind posttests. These findings are taken as evidence that the acquisition of sentential complements contributes to the development of theory of mind in preschoolers.

Abstract:

At the forefront of debates on language are new data demonstrating infants’ early acquisition of information about their native language. The data show that infants perceptually ‘‘map’’ critical aspects of ambient language in the first year of life before they can speak. Statistical properties of speech are picked up through exposure to ambient language. Moreover, linguistic experience alters infants’ perception of speech, warping perception in the service of language. Infants’ strategies are unexpected and unpredicted by historical views. A new theoretical position has emerged, and six postulates of this position are described.

Abstract:

Numerous studies over the past decade support the claim that infants are equipped with powerful statistical language learning mechanisms. The primary evidence for statistical language learning in word segmentation comes from studies using artificial languages, continuous streams of synthesized syllables that are highly simplified relative to real speech. To what extent can these conclusions be scaled up to natural language learning? In the current experiments, English-learning 8-month-old infants’ ability to track transitional probabilities in fluent infant-directed Italian speech was tested (N = 72). The results suggest that infants are sensitive to transitional probability cues in unfamiliar natural language stimuli, and support the claim that statistical learning is sufficiently robust to support aspects of real-world language acquisition.

Abstract:

Although Darwin insisted that human intelligence could be fully explained by the theory of evolution, the codiscoverer of natural selection, Alfred Russel Wallace, claimed that abstract intelligence was of no use to ancestral humans and could only be explained by intelligent design.Wallace’s apparent paradox can be dissolved with two hypotheses about human cognition.One is that intelligence is an adaptation to a knowledge-using, socially interdependent lifestyle, the “cognitive niche.” This embraces the ability to overcome the evolutionary fixed defenses of plants and animals by applications of reasoning, including weapons, traps, coordinated driving of game, and detoxification of plants. Such reasoning exploits intuitive theories about different aspects of the world, such as objects, forces, paths, places, states, substances, and other people’s beliefs and desires. The theory explains many zoologically unusual traits in Homo sapiens, including our complex toolkit, wide range of habitats and diets, extended childhoods and long lives, hypersociality, complex mating, division into cultures, and language (which multiplies the benefit of knowledge because know-how is useful not only for its practical benefits but as a trade good with others, enhancing the evolution of cooperation). The second hypothesis is that humans possess an ability of metaphorical abstraction, which allows them to coopt faculties that originally evolved for physical problem-solving and social coordination, apply them to abstract subject matter, and combine them productively. These abilities can help explain the emergence of abstract cognition without supernatural or exotic evolutionary forces and are in principle testable by analyses of statistical signs of selection in the human genome.

Abstract:

We present a similarity-based model of induction and categorization in young children (SINC). The model suggests that (a) linguistic labels contribute to similarity of compared entities, and (b) categorization and induction are a function of similarity computed over perceptual information and linguistic labels. The model also predicts young children’s similarity judgment, induction, and categorization performance under different stimuli and task conditions. Predictions of the model were tested and confirmed in six experiments, in which 4-5 year-olds performed similarity judgment, induction, and categorization tasks using artificial and real labels (Experiments 1-4), and recognition memory tasks (Experiments 5A and 5B). Results corroborate the similarity-based account of young children’s induction and categorization, and they support both qualitative and quantitative predictions of the model.

Abstract:

Three studies examined the abstractness of children's mental representation of counting, and their understanding of the cardinality principle, namely, that the last number word used in account tells how many items there are. In the first experiment, 24toddlers of 2-3 years counted objects, actions, and sounds. Findings revealed that children counted objects best; most were also able tocount actions and sounds. This finding suggests that at a very young age, children begin to develop an abstract mental representation ofthe counting routine. When asked, "How many?" after counting, only older children gave the last number word used in the count a majorityof the time. This suggests that children younger than 3.5 years do not understand the cardinality principle. In the second experiment,children were asked to give a puppet 1 through 6 items from a pile.Older children succeeded at this task. They spontaneously counted howmany items they gave, thus showing a clear understanding of the cardinality principle. Younger children succeeded only at giving 1,and sometimes 2, items, and never spontaneously counted. In experiment 3, 18 toddlers were asked several times for 1 through 6items. Results indicate that children learn the meanings of smaller number words before larger ones within their counting range up tonumber 3 or 4.